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Structural focalization
Robert J. Simmons
Focusing, introduced by Jean-Marc Andreoli in the context of classical linear logic [Andreoli 1992],
defines a normal form for sequent calculus derivations that cuts down on the number of possible
derivations by eagerly applying invertible rules and grouping sequences of non-invertible rules. A
focused sequent calculus is defined relative to some non-focused sequent calculus; focalization is
the property that every non-focused derivation can be transformed into a focused derivation.
In this paper, we present a focused sequent calculus for propositional intuitionistic logic and
prove the focalization property relative to a standard presentation of propositional intuitionistic
logic. Compared to existing approaches, the proof is quite concise, depending only on the internal
soundness and completeness of the focused logic. In turn, both of these properties can be es-
tablished (and mechanically verified) by structural induction in the style of Pfenning’s structural
cut elimination without the need for any tedious and repetitious invertibility lemmas. The proof
of cut admissibility for the focused system, which establishes internal soundness, is not particu-
larly novel. The proof of identity expansion, which establishes internal completeness, is a major
contribution of this work.
Draft as of March 19, 2014
1. INTRODUCTION
The propositions of intuitionistic propositional logic are easily recognizable and
standard: we will consider a logic with atomic propositions, falsehood, disjunction,
truth, conjunction, and implication.
P,Q ::= p | ⊥ | P1 ∨ P2 | > | P1 ∧ P2 | P1 ⊃ P2
The sequent calculus presentation for intuitionistic logic is also standard; the system
in Figure 1 is precisely the propositional fragment of Kleene’s sequent system G3 as
presented in [Pfenning 2000]. Contexts Γ are, as usual, considered to be unordered
multisets of propositions P , and the structural properties of exchange, weakening,
and contraction are admissible (each left rule incorporates a contraction).
Sequent calculi are a nice way of presenting logics, and a logic’s sequent calculus
presentation is a convenient setting in which to establish the logic’s metatheory
in a way that is straightforwardly mechanizable in proof assistants (like Twelf or
Agda) that are organized around the idea of structural induction. There are two
key metatheoretic properties that we are interested in. The first, cut admissibility,
justifies the use of lemmas: if we know P (if we have a derivation of the sequent
Γ −→ P ) and we know that Q follows from assuming P (if we have a derivation
of the sequent Γ, P −→ Q), then we can come to know Q without the additional
assumption of P (we can obtain a derivation of the sequent Γ −→ Q). 1 A proof
of the cut admissibility property establishes the internal soundness of a logic – it
1In common practice, the words proof and derivation are used interchangeably. In this article,
we will be careful to refer to the formal objects constructed using sequent calculus rules (such
as those in Figure 1) as derivations. Except when discussing natural deduction, the words proof
and theorem will refer to theorems proved about these formal objects; these are frequently called
metatheorems in the literature.
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Γ −→ P
Γ, p −→ p init (no rule ⊥R) Γ,⊥ −→ Q
⊥L
Γ −→ P1
Γ −→ P1 ∨ P2
∨R1
Γ −→ P2
Γ −→ P1 ∨ P2
∨R2
Γ, P1 ∨ P2, P1 −→ Q Γ, P1 ∨ P2, P2 −→ Q
Γ, P1 ∨ P2 −→ Q
∨L
Γ −→ > >R (no rule >L)
Γ −→ P1 Γ −→ P2
Γ −→ P1 ∧ P2
∧R
Γ, P1 ∧ P2, P1 −→ Q
Γ, P1 ∧ P2 −→ Q
∧L1
Γ, P1 ∧ P2, P2 −→ Q
Γ, P1 ∧ P2 −→ Q
∧L2
Γ, P1 −→ P2
Γ −→ P1 ⊃ P2
⊃R
Γ, P1 ⊃ P2 −→ P1 Γ, P1 ⊃ P2, P2 −→ Q
Γ, P1 ⊃ P2 −→ Q
⊃L
Fig. 1. Sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic.
implies that there are no closed derivations of contradiction, even by circuitous
reasoning using lemmas. The identity property asserts that assuming P is always
sufficient to conclude P , that is, that the sequent Γ, P −→ P is always derivable. A
proof of the identity property establishes the internal completeness of a logic. We
call these properties internal, following Pfenning [2010], to emphasize that these
are properties of the deductive system itself and not a comment on the system’s
relationship to any external semantics.
There is a tradition in logic, dating back to Gentzen [1935], that views the sequent
calculus as a convenient formalism for proving a logic’s metatheoretic properties
while viewing natural deduction proofs as the “true proof objects.”2 One reason
for this bias towards natural deduction is that natural deduction proofs have nice
normalization properties. A natural deduction proof is normal if if there are no
instances of an introduction rule immediately followed by an elimination rule of
the same connective; such detours give rise to local reductions which eliminate the
detour, such as this one:
D1
P1 true
D2
P2 true
P1 ∧ P2 true ∧I
P1 true
∧E1
=⇒R
D1
P1 true
The normalization property says that every natural deduction proof can be trans-
formed into a normal natural deduction proof.
We are frequently interested in the set of normal natural deduction proofs of a
given proposition. As an example, there is exactly one normal natural deduction
proof for (p∧q) ⊃ (r∧s) ⊃ (p∧r). Presented as a derivation, that natural deduction
2This discussion assumes a basic familiarity with natural deduction. We refer the interested reader
to Girard, Taylor, and Lafont’s Proofs and Types [Girard et al. 1989]; the aforementioned quote
comes from Section 5.4 of that work.
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proof looks like this:
p ∧ q true hypu
p true
∧E1 r ∧ s true
hypv
r true
∧E1
p ∧ r true ∧I
(r ∧ s) ⊃ (p ∧ r) true ⊃
v
I
(p ∧ q) ⊃ (r ∧ s) ⊃ (p ∧ r) true ⊃
u
I
Under the standard proof term assignment for natural deduction, this (normal) nat-
ural deduction proof corresponds to the (irreducible) proof term λx.λy.〈pi1x, pi1y〉.
In contrast, there are many sequent calculus derivations of the same proposition.
Here’s one of them:
p ∧ q, r ∧ s, p −→ p init
p ∧ q, r ∧ s −→ p ∧L1
p ∧ q, r ∧ s, r −→ r init
p ∧ q, r ∧ s −→ r ∧L1
p ∧ q, r ∧ s −→ p ∧ r ∧R
p ∧ q −→ (r ∧ s) ⊃ (p ∧ r) ⊃R
· −→ (p ∧ q) ⊃ (r ∧ s) ⊃ (p ∧ r) ⊃R
Reading from bottom to top, this derivation decomposes (p∧ q) ⊃ (r ∧ s) ⊃ (p∧ r)
on the right, then decomposes (r∧s) ⊃ (p∧r) on the right, then decomposes p∧r on
the right, and then (in one branch) decomposes p∧ q on the left while (in the other
branch) decomposing r∧s on the left. Other possibilities include decomposing p∧q
on the left before decomposing (r∧ s) ⊃ (p∧ r) on the right and decomposing r∧ s
on the left before p∧ r on the right; there are at least six different derivations even
if you don’t count derivations that do useless decompositions on the left.
These different derivations are particularly problematic if our goal is to do proof
search for sequent calculus derivations, as inessential differences between derivations
correspond to unnecessary choice points that a proof search procedure will need to
backtrack over. It was in this context that Andreoli originally introduced the idea
of focusing. Some connectives, such as implication A ⊃ B, are called asynchronous
because their right rules can always be applied eagerly, without backtracking, during
bottom-up proof search. Other connectives, such as disjunction A ∨ B, are called
synchronous because their right rules cannot be applied eagerly. For instance, the
∨R1 rule cannot be applied eagerly if we are looking for a derivation of p −→ ⊥∨ p.
This asynchronous or synchronous character is the connective’s polarity.3
3Andreoli dealt with a one-sided classical sequent calculus; in intuitionistic logic, it is common to
call asynchronous connectives right-asynchronous and left-synchronous. Similarly, it is common
to call synchronous connectives right-synchronous and left-asynchronous.
Synchronicity or polarity, a property of connectives, is closely connected to (and sometimes
conflated with) a property of rules called invertibility; a rule is invertible if the conclusion of the
rule implies each of the premises. So ⊃R is invertible (Γ −→ P1 ⊃ P2 implies Γ, P1 −→ P2) but ⊃L
is not (Γ, P1 ⊃ P2 −→ C does not imply Γ, P1 ⊃ P2 −→ P1). Rules that can be applied eagerly
need to be invertible, so asynchronous connectives have invertible right rules and synchronous
connectives have invertible left rules. Therefore, another synonym for asynchronous is right-
invertible, and another synonym for synchronous is left-invertible. This terminology would be
misleading in our case, as both the left and right rules for conjunction in Figure 1 are invertible.
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Andreoli’s key observation was that proof search only needs to consider deriva-
tions that have two alternating phases. In inversion phases, we eagerly apply
(invertible) right rules to asynchronous connectives and (invertible) left rules to
synchronous ones. When this is no longer possible, we begin a focusing phase by
putting a single remaining proposition in focus, repeatedly decomposing it (and
only it) by applying right rules to synchronous connectives and left rules to asyn-
chronous ones. Andreoli described this restricted form of proof search as a regular
proof search procedure in a restricted sequent calculus; such sequent calculi, and
derivations in them, are called focused as opposed to unfocused [Andreoli 1992].
In order to adopt such a proof search strategy, it is important to know that the
strategy is both sound (i.e., the proof search strategy will only say “the sequent
has a derivation” if that is the case) and complete (i.e., the proof search strategy
is capable of finding a derivation if one exists). Soundness proofs for focusing
are usually easy: focused derivations are essentially a syntactic refinement of the
unfocused derivations. Completeness, the nontrivial direction, involves turning
unfocused derivations into focused ones. This process is focalization.4 Thus, an
effective procedure for focalization is a constructive witness to the completeness of
focusing.
The techniques described in this article are general and can be straightforwardly
transferred to other modal and substructural logics, as explored in the author’s
dissertation [Simmons 2012]. Our approach has three key components, which we
will now discuss in turn.
Focalization via cut and identity. Existing focalization proofs almost all fall prey
to the need to prove multiple tedious invertibility lemmas describing the interaction
of each rule with every other rule; this results in proofs that are unrealistic to
write out, difficult to check, and exhausting to contemplate mechanizing. The way
forward was first suggested by Chaudhuri [2006]. In his dissertation, he established
the focalization property for linear logic as the consequence of the focused logic’s
internal soundness (the cut admissibility property) and completeness (the identity
property). Stating and proving the identity property for a focused sequent calculus
has remained a challenge, however. A primary contribution of this work is identity
expansion, a generalization of the identity property that is amenable to mechanized
proof by structural induction on propositions. This identity property is, in turn,
part of our larger development, a proof of the focalization property that entirely
avoids the tedious invertibility lemmas that plague existing approaches. (We review
existing techniques used to prove the focalization property in Section 6.)
Refining the focused calculus. The focused logic presented in this article is es-
sentially equivalent to the presentation of LJF given by Liang and Miller [2009], a
point we will return to in Section 2.1. A reader familiar with LJF will note three
4The usage of focus, focusing, focussing, and focalization is not standard in the literature. We use
the words focus and focusing to describe a logic (e.g. the focused sequent calculus) and aspects
of that logic (e.g. focused derivations, propositions in focus, left- or right-focused sequents, and
focusing phases). Focalization, derived from the French focalisation, is reserved exclusively for
the act of producing a focused derivation given an unfocused derivation; the focalization property
establishes that focalization is always possible.
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non-cosmetic differences. The first two, our use of a polarized variant of intuition-
istic logic and our novel treatment of atomic and suspended propositions, will be
discussed further in Section 2. A third change is that LJF does not force any par-
ticular ordering for the application of rules during a inversion phase. A seemingly
inevitable consequence of this choice is that the proof of focalization must estab-
lish the equivalence of all permutations of these invertible rules; this is one of the
aforementioned tedious invertibility lemmas that plague proofs of the focalization
property. Our focused logic, like many others (including Andreoli’s original system)
fixes a particular inversion order.
We introduce a new calculus rather than reusing an existing one in order to
present a focused logic and focalization proof that is computationally clean and
straightforward to both mechanize and apply to other logics. Our desire to mech-
anize proofs of the focalization property also informed our decision to use propo-
sitional intuitionistic logic. All proofs in this article are mechanized in both Twelf
[Pfenning and Schu¨rmann 1999] and Agda [Norell 2007], though we will only men-
tion the Twelf development. The concrete basis for our claim of computational
cleanliness is that our mechanizations are complete artifacts capturing the construc-
tive content of the proofs we present, and the size of this artifact scales linearly
relative to the number of connectives; the approaches we call “tedious” tend to
scale quadratically.
Proof terms. Since Andreoli’s original work, focused sequent calculus derivations
have been shown to be isomorphic to normal natural deduction proofs for restricted
fragments of logic [Cervesato and Pfenning 2003] and variations on the usual fo-
cusing discipline [Howe 2001]. Such results challenge the position that natural
deduction proofs are somehow more fundamental than sequent calculus derivations
and also indicate that focalization is a fundamental property of logic. In Section 2.4,
we present a proof term language for polarized intuitionistic logic that directly cap-
tures the branching and binding structure of focused derivations. The result is a
term language generalizing the spine form of Cervesato and Pfenning [2003].
Understanding focalization at the level of proof terms is not strictly necessary;
the theorems we prove are perfectly sensible as statements about sequent calculi.
We choose to present cut admissibility and identity expansion at the level of proof
terms in part because it emphasizes the constructive content of those theorems.
The constructive content of cut admissibility is a substitution function on proof
terms generalizing the hereditary substitution of Watkins et al. [2002] in a spine
form setting, and the constructive content of our identity expansion proof is a
novel η-expansion property on proof terms.
1.1 Outline
This article is dealing with three “soundness” properties and three “completeness”
properties, so it is important to carefully explain what we’re doing and when; the
following discussion is represented graphically in Figure 2.
We present a new proof of the completeness of focusing (the focalization property,
Theorem 4) for intuitionistic logic; the proof of the focalization property follows
from the internal soundness and completeness of the focused sequent calculus (cut
admissibility, Theorem 2, and identity expansion, Theorem 3). We will start, in
6 · Robert J. Simmons
“Soundness” “Completeness”
Focused,
polarized
l
Unfocused,
unpolarized
Cut admissibility
Theorem 2,
Section 3
Identity expansion
Theorem 3,
Section 4
Unfocused
admissibility lemmas
Section 5.1
De-focalization
Theorem 1,
Section 2.5
Focalization
Theorem 4,
Section 5.2
Cut admissibility
Corollary 1,
Section 5.3
Identity
Corollary 2,
Section 5.3
Fig. 2. Theorems and their dependencies.
Section 2, by motivating a polarized presentation of logic that syntactically differen-
tiates the synchronous and asynchronous propositions. We then present a focused
sequent calculus for polarized propositional intuitionistic logic and formally state
the soundness and completeness of focusing. We also prove the soundness of fo-
cusing (the de-focalization property, Theorem 1) in this section, but it’s pretty
boring and independent of the proofs of cut admissibility, identity expansion, and
the completeness of focusing.
Internal soundness for the focused sequent calculus is established by the cut ad-
missibility theorem in Section 3, and internal completeness for the focused sequent
calculus is established in Section 4 using a generalization of the identity expansion
theorem first developed in [Simmons and Pfenning 2011b]. In Section 5 we prove
the focalization property by showing unfocused admissibility, a group of lemmas
establishing that the focused sequent calculus can act like an unfocused sequent
calculus. Finally, rather than proving the internal soundness and completeness
(cut and identity) for the unfocused system directly, we show that these properties
can be established as corollaries of the first four theorems. In Section 6 we conclude
with an overview of existing proofs of the focalization property.
We will henceforth avoid using the words soundness and completeness as much
as possible. Instead, we will refer to the cut admissibility and identity theorems for
the focused and unfocused sequent calculi by name, and will refer to the soundness
and completeness of focusing as de-focalization and focalization, respectively.
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(p+)• = p+ (p−)• = p−
(↓A−)• = (A−)• (↑A+)• = (A+)•
(⊥)• = ⊥
(A+ ∨B+)• = (A+)• ∨ (B+)• (A+ ⊃ B−)• = (A+)• ⊃ (B−)•
(>+)• = > (>−)• = >
(A+ ∧+ B+)• = (A+)• ∧ (B+)• (A− ∧− B−)• = (A−)• ∧ (B−)•
Fig. 3. Erasure of polarized propositions.
2. POLARIZED LOGIC
There is a significant line of work on polarity in logic dating back to Andreoli [1992]
and Girard [1993]. That line of work holds that the asynchronous and synchronous
propositions are syntactic refinements of the set of propositions. We can deter-
mine the synchronous or asynchronous character of a proposition by inspecting its
outermost connective.5
In a 1991 note published to the LINEAR list [Girard 1991], Girard introduced the
idea of syntactically differentiating the positive propositions (those Andreoli called
synchronous) from the negative propositions (those Andreoli called asynchronous)
while mediating between the two with shifts: the upshift ↑A+ includes positive
propositions in the negative ones, and the downshift ↓A− includes negative propo-
sitions in the positive ones. This polarization6 of logic was developed further by
Girard in Ludics [Girard 2001] and treated extensively in Laurent and Zeilberger’s
Ph.D. theses [Laurent 2002; Zeilberger 2009b]. These are the propositions, positive
and negative, for polarized intuitionistic logic:
A+, B+, C+ ::= p+ | ↓A− | ⊥ | A+ ∨B+ | >+ | A+ ∧+ B+
A−, B−, C− ::= p− | ↑A+ | A+ ⊃ B− | >− | A− ∧− B−
Linear logic is able to unambiguously assign all connectives to one category or the
other, but in intuitionistic logic, truth > and conjunction P1∧P2 can be understood
as having either a positive character (corresponding to 1 and A+ ⊗ B+ in linear
logic) or a negative character (corresponding to > and A−&B− in linear logic).
We take the maximally general approach and allow both versions of truth and
conjunction, which are decorated to emphasize their polarity.
The shifts introduced by Girard were modalities that might change the provability
of a proposition. We adopt the later stance of Zeilberger [2009b], McLaughlin and
Pfenning [2009], and others: shifts influence the structure of derivations, but not the
provability of propositions. Therefore, we expect there to be a focused derivation
5Linear logic naturally has two polarities. Other systems, like Girard’s LU and Liang and Miller’s
LKU, use more than these two polarities [Girard 1993; Liang and Miller 2011]. Furthermore, in
LU the polarity of a proposition is determined by more than just the outermost connective.
6For the purposes of this article we are making somewhat artificial distinction between polarity,
Andreoli’s classification of propositions as asynchronous and synchronous, and polarization, the
segregation of these two classes as positive or negative propositions by using shifts. This distinction
is not a standard one: “synchronous” and “positive” are elsewhere used interchangeably, “polarity”
is used to describe what we call “polarization,” and so on.
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of A+ or A− if and only if there is an unfocused derivation of (A+)• or (A−)•,
where (−)• is the erasure function given in Figure 3. The polarity of an atomic
proposition can be arbitrary as long as it is consistent, as if each individual atomic
proposition p is really intrinsically positive or negative, but the calculus in Figure 1
didn’t notice.
Shifts and polarization are computationally interesting phenomena. Our view of
polarization lines up with the call-by-push-value system independently developed
by Levy: positive propositions correspond to value types and negative propositions
correspond to computation types [Levy 2004]. Shifts are also useful in theorem
proving. By employing different polarization strategies, the name for partial in-
verses of erasure, the Imogen theorem prover can simulate fully-focused LJF proof
search, proof search in an unfocused logic like Kleene’s G3, and proof search in
many other partially-focused systems in between [McLaughlin and Pfenning 2009].
Furthermore, forward-chaining versus backward-chaining logic programming can
be seen as arising from particular polarization strategies in uniform proof search
[Chaudhuri et al. 2008]. However, in this article polarization is primarily a technical
device. Shifts makes it clearer that certain proofs are structurally inductive over
propositions, especially identity expansion (Theorem 3). Additionally, the focus-
interrupting nature of the shift is a critical part of our unfocused admissibility
lemmas.7
2.1 Sequent calculus
We will develop our focused sequent calculus in two stages; in the first stage we do
not consider atomic propositions. We can present sequents for our polarized logic
in two equivalent ways. In the one-sequent view, we say that all sequents have the
form Γ;L ` U . The components of a sequent are defined by the following (currently
incomplete) grammar:
Hypothetical contexts Γ ::= · | Γ, A− | . . .
Inversion contexts Ω ::= · | A+,Ω
Antecedents L ::= Ω | [A−]
Succedents U ::= [A+] | A+ | A− | . . .
This first view requires us to further restrict the form of sequents for two reasons.
First, we only want to focus on one proposition at a time, so only one right focus
[A+] or left focus [A−] should be present in a sequent. Second, focus and inversion
phases should not overlap, so it must be the case that L = · when U = [A+] and
that U 6= A− when L = [A−]. Given this restriction, the first view of sequents is
equivalent to a three-sequent view in which there are three different sequent forms:
—Right focus: Γ ` [A+], where L = · and is therefore omitted,
7Something like a shift is necessary for Liang and Miller’s focalization proofs as well. Because their
logic has polarity but no shifts, they construct delays δ+(A) = >+ ∧+ A and δ−(A) = >+ ⊃ A
to force asynchronous or synchronous connectives to behave (respectively) like synchronous or
asynchronous ones [Liang and Miller 2009]. This gets in the way of defining logical fragments
by adding or removing connectives, as the presence of the connective >+ is fundamental to their
completeness proof.
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Γ ` [A+] – right focus
Γ; · ` A−
Γ ` [↓A−] ↓R
(no rule ⊥R)
Γ ` [A+]
Γ ` [A+ ∨B+]
∨R1
Γ ` [B+]
Γ ` [A+ ∨B+]
∨R2
Γ ` [>+] >
+
R
Γ ` [A+] Γ ` [B+]
Γ ` [A+ ∧+ B+] ∧
+
R
Γ; Ω ` U – inversion, U 6= [A+]
Γ ` [A+]
Γ; · ` A+ focR
U stable Γ, A−; [A−] ` U
Γ, A−; · ` U focL
Γ, A−; Ω ` U
Γ; ↓A−,Ω ` U ↓L
Γ;⊥,Ω ` U ⊥L
Γ;A+,Ω ` U Γ;B+,Ω ` U
Γ;A+ ∨B+,Ω ` U
∨L
Γ; Ω ` U
Γ;>+,Ω ` U >
+
L
Γ;A+, B+,Ω ` U
Γ;A+ ∧+ B+,Ω ` U ∧
+
L
Γ; · ` A+
Γ; · ` ↑A+ ↑R
Γ;A+ ` B−
Γ; · ` A+ ⊃ B−
⊃R
Γ; · ` >− >
−
R
Γ; · ` A− Γ; · ` B−
Γ; · ` A− ∧− B− ∧
−
R
Γ; [A−] ` U – left focus, U must be stable
Γ;A+ ` U
Γ; [↑A+] ` U ↑L
Γ ` [A+] Γ; [B−] ` U
Γ; [A+ ⊃ B−] ` U
⊃L
(no rule >−L )
Γ; [A−] ` U
Γ; [A− ∧− B−] ` U ∧
−
L1
Γ; [B−] ` U
Γ; [A− ∧− B−] ` U ∧
−
L2
U stable
A+ stable
Fig. 4. Focused sequent calculus for polarized intuitionistic logic (sans suspended propositions).
—Inversion: Γ; Ω ` U , where U 6= [A+], and
—Left focus: Γ; [A−] ` U , where U is stable (more about this shortly).
The sequent calculus for polarized intuitionistic logic in Figure 4 is presented in
terms of this three-sequent view. The right focus sequent Γ ` [A+] describes a state
in which non-invertible right rules are being applied to positive propositions, the
left focus sequent Γ; [A−] ` U describes a state in which non-invertible left rules
are being applied to negative propositions, and the inversion sequent Γ; Ω ` U
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describes everything else. While we treat the hypothetical context Γ informally as
a multiset, the inversion context Ω is not a multiset. Instead, it should be thought
of as an ordered sequence of positive propositions: the empty sequence is written
as “·” and “,” is an associative append operator. Whenever the inversion context
Ω is non-empty, the only applicable rule is the one that decomposes the left-most
positive connective in Ω.
The picture in Figure 4 is quite uniform: every rule except for focR and focL
breaks down a single connective, while the shift rules regulate the focus and in-
version phases. Read from bottom up, they put an end to the process of breaking
down a proposition under focus (↓R, ↑L) and to the process of breaking down a
proposition with inversion (↓L, ↑R). All other rules maintain focus or inversion on
the subformulas of a proposition.
The conclusions of focR and focL are inversion sequents with empty inversion
contexts and succedents U that are stable, meaning that there is no possibility of
applying an invertible rule. These stable sequents (sometimes called neutral) have
an important place in focused sequent calculi. In the introduction, we claimed that
there was an essential equivalence between LJF and our focused presentation, but
this is only true if we ignore the internal structure of focus and inversion phases
and work with synthetic rules, the derivation fragments comprised of one or more
inversion phases stacked on top of a single focused phase. In the synthetic view
of focusing, we abstract away from the internal structure of focusing phases to
emphasize the stable sequents that lie between them [Andreoli 2001]. LJF and our
presentation of polarized intuitionistic logic have different internal structure, but
we claim that the systems give rise to the same synthetic rules.8 Aside from our
use of shifts, we depart from Liang and Miller in ways that are technically relevant
but that are invisible at the level of synthetic connectives.
The stability requirement for U in left focus sequents Γ; [A−] ` U can equiva-
lently be stated as a extra premise U stable for the rule ↑L, which is done in the
accompanying Twelf development. (Our placement of the premise on focL shows a
bit of bias towards bottom-up proof construction.)
2.2 Suspended propositions
The pleasant picture of focusing given above must become more complicated when
we consider atomic propositions. Atomic propositions are best understood as stand-
ins for arbitrary propositions, and so our polarized logic has both positive atomic
propositions (stand-ins for arbitrary positive propositions) and negative atomic
propositions (stand-ins for arbitrary negative propositions).
When we are performing inversion and we reach an atomic proposition, we do not
have enough information to break down that proposition any further, but we have
not reached a shift. We have to do something different. What we do is suspend
that atomic proposition, either in the hypothetical context or in the succedent.
We represent a suspended atomic proposition as 〈p+〉 or 〈p−〉. If we wanted to
closely follow existing focused sequent calculi, we would introduce two more rules
for proving atomic propositions in focus using a suspended atomic proposition. The
8Our presentation does not have the first-order quantifiers present in LJF, and LJF lacks a negative
unit >−, but quantifiers can be added to our system easily, and the same is true for >− in LJF.
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Γ, 〈A+〉 ` [A+] id
+
Γ; [A−] ` 〈A−〉 id
−
Γ, 〈p+〉; Ω ` U
Γ; p+,Ω ` U η
+
Γ; · ` 〈p−〉
Γ; · ` p− η
−
〈A−〉 stable
Fig. 5. Focused sequent calculus, extended with suspended propositions
resulting extension of Figure 4 would look something like this:
Γ, 〈p+〉; Ω ` U
Γ; p+,Ω ` U
Γ; · ` 〈p−〉
Γ; · ` p− Γ, 〈p+〉 ` [p+] Γ; [p−] ` 〈p−〉 〈p−〉 stable
This treatment is not incorrect and is obviously analogous to the init rule from
the unfocused system in Figure 1. Nevertheless, we contend that this is a de-
sign error and a large part of why it has historically been difficult to prove the
identity theorem for focused systems. We generalize the rules above by allowing
the hypothetical context to contain arbitrary suspended positive propositions (not
just atomic positive propositions) and allowing the succedent to contain arbitrary
suspended negative propositions (not just atomic negative propositions).
This generalization allows us to finally give the complete grammar of hypothetical
contexts and succedents:
Hypothetical contexts Γ ::= · | Γ, A− | Γ, 〈A+〉
Succedents U ::= [A+] | A+ | A− | 〈A−〉
The rules for atomic propositions, extending Figure 4, are given in Figure 5. The
η+ and η− rules are the same as the ones we discussed above, reflecting the fact
that the inversion process must suspend itself at an atomic proposition and should
not suspend itself any earlier. The id+ and id− rules directly describe an identity
or hypothesis principle, but only for suspended propositions.
These more general id+ and id− rules allow us to define two substitution prin-
ciples, which are critical for the proof of identity expansion in Section 4. The
derivation of a right-focused sequent [A+] can discharge 〈A+〉 in the hypothetical
context, and the derivation of a left-focused sequent [A−] can discharge 〈A−〉 in
the succedent. Written as admissible rules, these two focal substitution principles
are as follows:
Γ ` [A+] Γ, 〈A+〉;L ` U
Γ;L ` U subst
+
Γ;L ` 〈A−〉 Γ; [A−] ` U
Γ;L ` U subst
−
It is straightforward to establish the positive focal substitution principle by in-
duction over the derivation of Γ, 〈A+〉;L ` U , and it is likewise straightforward
to establish the negative substitution principle by induction over the derivation of
Γ;L ` 〈A−〉. When the last rule in the derivation we’re inducting over is id+ or
id−, we return the derivation we’re not inducting over, and in every other case we
apply the induction hypothesis directly.9
9In the case of the rules η+ and ↓L, we also apply an admissible weakening principle to the
derivation we’re not inducting over.
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(Ω)• (·)• = · (A+,Ω)• = (A+)•, (Ω)•
(Γ)~ (·)~ = · (Γ, A−)~ = (Γ)~, (A−)• (Γ, 〈p+〉)~ = (Γ)~, p+
(L)~ ([A−])~ = (A−)• (Ω)~ = (Ω)•
(U)~ ([A+])~ = (A+)• (A+)~ = (A+)• (A−)~ = (A−)• (〈p−〉)~ = p−
Fig. 6. Erasure of contexts and succedents. (A+)• and (A−)• are defined in Figure 3.
The admissible rules subst+ and subst− are uniform substitution principles. This
means that, in the accompanying Twelf development, it is possible to get them
both for free from the LF function space, the same way we get weakening and
contraction of the hypothetical context for free and generally take it for granted.
This is natural in the case of positive focal substitution: we interpret the suspended
atomic proposition 〈A+〉 as a uniform assumption that A+ is provable in right focus.
It is more counterintuitive to get negative focal substitution for free in LF; we refer
the reader to the accompanying Twelf development for details.
The logic extended with these more general id+ and id− rules conservatively
extends the logic with the more traditional rules we initially proposed. Reading
rules from bottom to top, the rules η+ and η− are the only ones that introduce
suspended propositions. Therefore, given the derivation of a sequent where every
suspended proposition is atomic, we know that every instance of id+ and id− in that
derivation acts on an atomic proposition. We call sequents where every suspended
proposition is atomic suspension-normal sequents. Certain operations, in particular
erasure and cut admissibility, are only defined on suspension-normal sequents and
derivations of these sequents.
2.3 Erasure and focalization
We presented the erasure of propositions in Figure 3, and Figure 6 describes the
erasure of a polarized contexts and sequents. Note that erasure is only defined on
hypothetical contexts Γ and succedents U that are suspension-normal.
Erasure is a pretty boring operation, important mainly because it allows us to
state soundness and completeness of focusing. We want to understand complete-
ness in terms of stable, suspension-normal sequents, so the correctness of focusing
states that, if Γ and U are stable and suspension-normal, Γ; · ` U if and only if
(Γ)~ −→ (U)~. The backward (completeness) direction is focalization and the
forward (soundness) direction is de-focalization.
Many different polarized propositions will typically erase to the same unpolarized
proposition. The proposition used in the example from the introduction, (p ∧ q) ⊃
(r ∧ s) ⊃ (p ∧ r), is the erasure of each of the following:
↓(p ∧− q) ⊃ ↓(r ∧− s) ⊃ (p ∧− r) (1)
(p ∧+ q) ⊃ (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r) (2)
↓(↑p ∧− ↑q) ⊃ ↑↓(↓(↑r ∧− ↑s) ⊃ ↑↓(↑p ∧− ↑r)) (3)
Note that the first proposition implies a negative polarity for all atomic propositions
and the last two propositions imply a positive polarity.
The first and second propositions each have exactly one focused derivation, just
Structural focalization · 13
as the unpolarized propositions had exactly one normal natural deduction proof.
The unique derivation of (1) is structurally similar to the unfocused derivation from
the introduction:
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; [p] ` 〈p〉 id
−
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; [p ∧− q] ` 〈p〉 ∧
−
L1
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; · ` 〈p〉 focL
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; · ` p η
−
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; [r] ` 〈r〉 id
−
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; [r ∧− s] ` 〈r〉 ∧
−
L1
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; · ` 〈r〉 focL
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; · ` r η
−
p ∧− q, r ∧− s; · ` p ∧− r ∧
−
R
p ∧− q; ↓(r ∧− s) ` p ∧− r ↓L
p ∧− q; · ` ↓(r ∧− s) ⊃ (p ∧− r) ⊃R
·; ↓(p ∧− q) ` ↓(r ∧− s) ⊃ (p ∧− r) ↓L
·; · ` ↓(p ∧− q) ⊃ ↓(r ∧− s) ⊃ (p ∧− r) ⊃R
The unique derivation of (2) decomposes the proposition in a completely different
order:
〈p〉, 〈q〉, 〈r〉, 〈s〉 ` [p] id
+
〈p〉, 〈q〉, 〈r〉, 〈s〉 ` [r] id
+
〈p〉, 〈q〉, 〈r〉, 〈s〉 ` [p ∧+ r] ∧
+
R
〈p〉, 〈q〉, 〈r〉, 〈s〉; · ` p ∧+ r focR
〈p〉, 〈q〉, 〈r〉, 〈s〉; · ` ↑(p ∧+ r) ↑R
〈p〉, 〈q〉, 〈r〉; s ` ↑(p ∧+ r) η
+
〈p〉, 〈q〉; r, s ` ↑(p ∧+ r) η
+
〈p〉, 〈q〉; r ∧+ s ` ↑(p ∧+ r) ∧
+
L
〈p〉, 〈q〉; · ` (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r) ⊃R
〈p〉; q ` (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r) η
+
·; p, q ` (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r) η
+
·; p ∧+ q ` (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r) ∧
+
L
·; · ` (p ∧+ q) ⊃ (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r) ⊃R
These examples illustrate how polarity and focusing can dramatically reduce the
bureaucratic nondeterminism present in the unfocused sequent calculus. To be
clear, however, we have chosen to reduce that bureaucratic nondeterminism: the
derivations of proposition (3) are isomorphic to the unfocused derivations of the
original, unpolarized proposition.
Our statement of the focalization property applies to all polarization strategies.
Having obtained this strong focalization property, if we are given an unfocused
derivation of any unpolarized sequent (such as · −→ (p ∧ q) ⊃ (r ∧ s) ⊃ (p ∧ r)), we
can use any polarization strategy at our disposal to turn the unpolarized sequent
into a polarized sequent (such as ·; · ` ↓((p ∧+ q) ⊃ (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↓(p ∧+ r))) and then
use focalization to transform the unfocused derivation into a focused derivation.
Our proof that unfocused cut and identity follow from focused cut and identity
does require that we know about some polarization strategy, but that will be the
extent to which the present technical development relies on the matter.
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With the exception of Zeilberger [2008b], proofs of the focalization property tend
not to operate on the basis of erasure. Erasure-based polarization only emerges
clearly as an option in a logic with shifts; Andreoli’s focused classical linear logic
[1992], Chaudhuri’s focused intuitionistic linear logic [2006], and Liang and Miller’s
LJF [2009] all approach focalization for a logic where there are no shifts and where
polarity is derived from a proposition’s topmost connective. From our polarized
perspective, these approaches can all be seen as defining a particular polarization
strategy (Γ −→ P )◦ that transforms unpolarized sequents into polarized ones. It
is then possible to state and prove a strictly weaker focalization property: that
(Γ −→ P )◦ is derivable if and only if Γ −→ P is derivable.
2.4 Proof terms
While it is convenient and traditional to define a logic in terms of rules, we follow
Herbelin [1995] in noting that it is sometimes easier to manipulate derivations using
an appropriately-designed proof term presentation of the logic. Our proof term
language is primarily a generalization of the spine form introduced by Cervesato
and Pfenning [2003].10 Spine form is a proof term assignment for the so-called
uniform proofs, the focused fragment of a logic that only includes the negative
(or asynchronous) propositions. In spine form, terms and spines correspond to
derivations of inversion sequents and left-focused sequents, respectively; we also
consider values corresponding to derivations of right-focused sequents.
Values V ::= z | thunkN | inlV | inr V | 〈〉+ | 〈V1, V2〉+
Terms N,M ::= retV | x ◦ S | 〈z〉.N | x.N | abort | [N1, N2] | 〈〉.N | ×N
| 〈N〉 | {N} | λN | 〈〉− | 〈N1, N2〉−
Spines S ::= nil | pmN | V ;S | pi1;S | pi2;S
The separation of our syntax into three categories corresponds to the three-sequent
view of our calculus. We will also refer to proof terms generically as expressions E
when we want to invoke the one-sequent view of our system.
Only two terms bind new variables. The term 〈z〉.N , corresponding to the rule
η+, binds a positive variable z (a variable corresponding to a suspended proposi-
tion). The term x.N , corresponding to the rule ↑L, binds a new negative variable
x (a variable corresponding to a negative proposition). We will freely span the
Curry-Howard correspondence (or “propositions as types”), calling a value that
corresponds to a derivation of the right-focused sequent Γ ` [A+] a value focused
on A+ and calling a spine that corresponds to a derivation of the left-focused se-
quent Γ; [A−] ` B+ or Γ; [A−] ` 〈B−〉 a spine of type B+ or B− (respectively)
focused on A−. Terms that correspond to stable sequents Γ; · ` A+ and Γ; · ` 〈A−〉
are (respectively) terms of type A+ or A−. Terms corresponding to derivations of
more general inversion sequents like Γ; Ω ` A+ and Γ; Ω ` A− are (respectively)
terms of type A+ introducing Ω and terms introducing Ω and A−. We reserve the
word type for stable succedents to emphasize that these are the important elements
in the synthetic view of focusing.
It is possible to re-present the entire sequent calculus from Figures 4 and 5
10We also draw inspiration from the syntax of CLF [Watkins et al. 2002], call-by-push-value [Levy
2004], and Modernized Algol [Harper 2012] for our syntax.
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Γ ` V : [A+] – values V
Γ, z:〈A+〉 ` z : [A+] id
+
Γ; · ` N : A−
Γ ` thunkN : [↓A−] ↓R
(no rule ⊥R)
Γ ` V : [A+]
Γ ` inlV : [A+ ∨B+]
∨R1
Γ ` V : [B+]
Γ ` inr V : [A+ ∨B+]
∨R2
Γ ` 〈〉+ : [>+] >
+
R
Γ ` V1 : [A+] Γ ` V2 : [B+]
Γ ` 〈V1, V2〉+ : [A+ ∧+ B+]
∧+R
Γ; Ω ` N : U – terms N , U 6= [A+]
Γ ` V : [A+]
Γ; · ` retV : A+ focR
U stable Γ, x:A−; [A−] ` S : U
Γ, x:A−; · ` x ◦ S : U focL
Γ, z:〈p+〉; Ω ` N : U
Γ; p+,Ω ` 〈z〉.N : U η
+
Γ, x:A−; Ω ` N : U
Γ; ↓A−,Ω ` x.N : U ↓L
Γ;⊥,Ω ` abort : U ⊥L
Γ;A+,Ω ` N1 : U Γ;B+,Ω ` N2 : U
Γ;A+ ∨B+,Ω ` [N1, N2] : U
∨L
Γ; Ω ` N : U
Γ;>+,Ω ` 〈〉.N : U >
+
L
Γ;A+, B+,Ω ` N : U
Γ;A+ ∧+ B+,Ω ` ×N : U ∧
+
L
Γ; · ` N : 〈p−〉
Γ; · ` 〈N〉 : p− η
− Γ; · ` N : A
+
Γ; · ` {N} : ↑A+ ↑R
Γ;A+ ` N : B−
Γ; · ` λN : A+ ⊃ B−
⊃R
Γ; · ` 〈〉− : >− >
−
R
Γ; · ` N1 : A− Γ; · ` N2 : B−
Γ; · ` 〈N1, N2〉− : A− ∧− B−
∧−R
Γ; [A−] ` S : U – spines S, U must be stable
Γ; [A−] ` nil : 〈A−〉 id
− Γ;A
+ ` N : U
Γ; [↑A+] ` pmN : U ↑L
Γ ` V : [A+] Γ; [B−] ` S : U
Γ; [A+ ⊃ B−] ` V ;S : U
⊃L
(no rule >−L )
Γ; [A−] ` S : U
Γ; [A− ∧− B−] ` pi1;S : U
∧−L1
Γ; [B−] ` S : U
Γ; [A− ∧− B−] ` pi2;S : U
∧−L2
U stable
A+ stable 〈A−〉 stable
Fig. 7. Proof terms for the focused sequent calculus.
annotating sequents with values, terms, and spines; the result is Figure 7. This
“Curry-style” view, which sees types as extrinsic to the proof terms, is helpful as
a reference, but it does not otherwise serve our purposes. Instead, we will proceed
with a “Church-style” view of types as intrinsic. This necessitates thinking of proof
terms as carrying some extra annotations; Pfenning writes these as superscripts
[Pfenning 2008], but which we will follow Girard in leaving them implicit [Girard
et al. 1989]. In particular, positive variables z must be annotated with positive
propositions, negative variables x must be annotated with negative propositions,
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Proof term: λx1.λx2.〈〈x1 ◦ (pi1;nil)〉, 〈x2 ◦ (pi1;nil)〉〉−
SML: fn x1 => fn x2 => (#1 x1, #1 x2)
Type: ↓(p ∧− q) ⊃ ↓(r ∧− s) ⊃ (p ∧− r)
Proof term: λ×z1.z2.λ×z3.z4.{ret 〈z1, z3〉+}
SML: fn (z1, z2) => fn (z3, z4) => (z1, z3)
Type: (p ∧+ q) ⊃ (r ∧+ s) ⊃ ↑(p ∧+ r)
Proof term: λf.λg.λ〈z〉.λ[(〈z1〉.〈f ◦ (z1; z;nil)〉),
(〈z2〉.〈g ◦ (〈z2, z〉+;nil)〉]
SML: fn f => fn g => fn z => (fn Inl z1 => f z1 z
| Inr z2 => g (z2, z))
Type: ↓(p+ ⊃ s+ ⊃ r−) ⊃ ↓(q+ ∧+ s+ ⊃ r−) ⊃ s+ ⊃ (p+ ∨ q+) ⊃ r−
Proof term: λ〈z〉.λf.λg.{f ◦ (z; pm [(〈z1〉.g ◦ (z1; pm 〈z3〉.ret z3)),
(〈z2〉.ret z2)])}
SML: fn z => fn f => fn g => (case (f z) of
Inl z1 => (case g z1 of z3 => z3)
| Inr z2 => z2)
Type: p+ ⊃ ↓(p+ ⊃ ↑(q+ ∨ r+)) ⊃ ↓(q+ ⊃ ↑r+) ⊃ ↑r+
Fig. 8. Some proof terms and their rough translation into Standard ML.
and inl, inr, pi1, and pi2 must be annotated with the branch of the disjunction or
conjunction that was not taken. This suffices to ensure that proof terms are in 1-to-1
correspondence with sequent calculus derivations modulo the structural properties
of exchange and weakening.11
We will make a habit of presenting proof terms for admissible rules as well.
The admissible focal substitution principles labeled subst+ and subst− above are
respectively associated with the functions [V/z]E and [E]S that act on proof terms:
Γ ` V : [A+] Γ, z:〈A+〉;L ` E : U
Γ;L ` [V/z]E : U
Γ;L ` E : 〈A−〉 Γ; [A−] ` S : U
Γ;L ` [E]S : U
Patterns. Our proof term calculus departs in one important way from most pre-
sentations of focused proof terms. In other work, the trend is to introduce the
variables needed for an inversion phase all at once in a syntactic entity called a
pattern; one significant example is Krishnaswami’s presentation of ML-style pat-
tern matching and pattern compilation in the context of a focused sequent calculus
[Krishnaswami 2009]. We do not use patterns because doing so would not be faith-
ful to the LF encoding of Figure 4 used in the accompanying Twelf development;
patterns cause the inductive structure of proof terms and sequents to deviate, even
if they remain in 1-to-1 correspondence.
While a full discussion of patterns is beyond the scope of this article, we also want
to suggest that our choice is the natural one from the perspective of the sequent
11Our desire present cut admissibility and identity expansion using proof terms is one reason we
use so many syntactic markers in our proof terms. These markers (×N , 〈N〉, and {N}, etc.) may
be omitted in a Curry-style presentation.
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calculus. Patterns are certainly relevant in the study of logic and programming
languages, but they seem more in line with natural deduction presentations of
logic or with higher-order focused presentations, which can be seen as a synthesis
of natural deduction and sequent calculus presentations [Zeilberger 2009b; Brock-
Nannestad and Schu¨rmann 2010].
Examples. Using Standard ML’s syntax as an imperfect proxy for a natural-
deduction system with pattern matching, we give, in Figure 8, some proof terms
and our suggestion as to the corresponding natural deduction term. Note that if
M is a term introducing B− then the proof term corresponding to ↓A− ⊃ B−
is λx.M , though in this case the familiar construct is comprised of two smaller
constructs, the proof term corresponding to ⊃R and the proof term corresponding
to ↓L. The spine form pmM comes from Levy’s CBPV, stands for pattern match,
and corresponds to case in Standard ML.
2.5 De-focalization
We conclude this section by presenting the de-focalization property, that Γ; · ` U
implies (Γ)~ −→ (U)~, which we can prove independently of any of the standard
metatheoretic results for either system. In order to generalize the induction hypoth-
esis, we define a new sequent form Γ; Ψ −→ P , where Ψ is an ordered sequence that
mimics the inversion context Ω. The meaning of this sequent is defined by two rules
which force the ordered Ψ context to introduce its contents into the hypothetical
context Γ in a left-to-right order:
Γ, P ; Ψ −→ Q
Γ;P,Ψ −→ Q cons
Γ −→ Q
Γ; · −→ Q nil
With this definition, we can state the appropriate generalization of the induction
hypothesis; our desired de-focalization property is a corollary.
Theorem 1 De-focalization. If Γ;L ` U , then (Γ)~; (L)~ −→ (U)~
We can also state Theorem 1 using the three-sequent view of our logic. This state-
ment of the theorem has three parts:
(1) If Γ ` [A+], then (Γ)~; · −→ (A+)•,
(2) If Γ; Ω ` U , then (Γ)~; (Ω)• −→ (U)~, and
(3) If Γ; [A−] ` U , then (Γ)~; (A−)• −→ (U)~.
Proof. By induction and case analysis on the given derivation; D :: Γ −→ P
denotes that D is a derivation of Γ −→ P . Twenty-one of the twenty-four cases are
blindingly straightforward, such as this one:
Case. D =
D1
Γ ` [A+]
D2
Γ ` [B+]
Γ ` [A+ ∧B+] ∧
+
R
E1 :: (Γ)~; · −→ (A+)• by the i.h. (part 1) on D1
E ′1 :: (Γ)~ −→ (A+)• by inversion on E1
E2 :: (Γ)~; · −→ (B+)• by the i.h. (part 1) on D2
E ′2 :: (Γ)~ −→ (B+)• by inversion on E2
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E :: (Γ)~ −→ (A+)• ∧ (B+)• by rule ∧R on E1 and E2
E :: (Γ)~ −→ (A+ ∧+ B+)• (A+ ∧+ B+)• = (A+)• ∧ (B+)•
E ′ :: (Γ)~; · −→ (A+ ∧+ B+)• by rule nil on E .
For three cases corresponding to the rules ⊥L, ∨L, and ∧+L , a secondary induction
is needed to show the admissibility, in the unfocused sequent calculus, of left rules
that have a context Ψ.
Case. D =
D1
Γ;A+, B+,Ω ` U
Γ;A+ ∧B+,Ω ` U ∧
+
L
E1 :: (Γ)~; (A+, B+,Ω)• −→ (U)~ by i.h. (part 2) on D1
E1 :: (Γ)~; (A+)•, (B+)•, (Ω)• −→ (U)~ (A+, B+,Ω)• = (A+)•, (B+)•, (Ω)•
E ′1 :: (Γ)~, (A+)•; (B+)•, (Ω)• −→ (U)~ by inversion on E1
E ′′1 :: (Γ)~, (A+)•, (B+)•; (Ω)• −→ (U)~ by inversion on E ′1
E :: (Γ)~, (A+)• ∧ (B+)•; (Ω)• −→ (U)~ by lemma on E ′′1
E :: (Γ)~, (A+ ∧+ B+)•; (Ω)• −→ (U)~ (A+ ∧+ B+)• = (A+)• ∧ (B+)•
E ′ :: (Γ)~; (A+ ∧+ B+)•, (Ω)• −→ (U)~ by rule cons on E ′
E ′ :: (Γ)~; (A+ ∧+ B+,Ω)• −→ (U)~ (A+ ∧+ B+,Ω)• = (A+ ∧+ B+)•, (Ω)•
The necessary lemma is that Γ, P1, P2; Ψ −→ Q, implies Γ, P1 ∧ P2; Ψ −→ Q. We
proceed by induction on Ψ and by case analysis on the structure of the given
derivation.
Subcase. D =
D1
Γ, P1, P2, P ; Ψ −→ Q
Γ, P1, P2;P,Ψ −→ Q
cons
D′1 :: Γ, P, P1, P2; Ψ −→ Q by exchange on D1
E1 :: Γ, P, P1 ∧ P2; Ψ −→ Q by i.h. on D′1
E ′1 :: Γ, P1 ∧ P2, P ; Ψ −→ Q by exchange on E1
E :: Γ, P1 ∧ P2;P,Ψ −→ Q by rule cons on E ′1
Subcase. D =
D1
Γ, P1, P2 −→ Q
Γ, P1, P2; · −→ Q nil
D′1 :: Γ, P1 ∧ P2, P1, P2 −→ Q by weakening on D1
E1 :: Γ, P1 ∧ P2, P1 −→ Q by rule ∧L2 on D′1
E ′1 :: Γ, P1 ∧ P2 −→ Q by rule ∧L1 on E1
E :: Γ, P1 ∧ P2; · −→ Q by rule nil on E ′1
The 22 other cases of the main theorem and the 2 other lemmas are similar. This
theorem is named sound in the accompanying Twelf development.
The lemma for ∧+L and the two similar lemmas for ⊥L and ∨L are as close as
we will get to the tedious invertibility lemmas encountered by other proofs of the
focalization property. Because of the way we have structured our system, each
lemma only requires induction and case analysis over the definition of Γ; Ψ −→ P ,
which is defined by two rules, cons and nil . Therefore, our proof remains linear in
the number of connectives and rules, rather than quadratic as in other approaches.
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3. CUT ADMISSIBILITY
The statement of cut admissibility in an unpolarized logic is that Γ −→ P and
Γ, P −→ Q imply Γ −→ Q. In polarized logic, we have positive and negative
propositions, so the cut admissibility theorem must, at minimum, have two parts:
a negative cut, that Γ; · ` A− and Γ, A−; · ` U imply Γ; · ` U , and a positive cut,
that Γ; · ` A+ and Γ;A+ ` U imply Γ; · ` U . The actual proof of cut admissibility
will require further generalization, but these statements are corollaries. As in the
statement of de-focalization, we state cut admissibility using the one-sequent view
of sequents in order to cut down on the number of individual statements that we
need to consider (4 parts instead of the 7 we would need otherwise).
Theorem 2 Cut admissibility. If Γ and U are suspension-normal, then
(1 ) If Γ ` [A+] and Γ;A+,Ω ` U , then Γ; Ω ` U ,
(2 ) If Γ; · ` A−, Γ; [A−] ` U , and U stable, then Γ; · ` U ,
(3 ) If Γ; · ` A− and Γ, A−;L ` U , then Γ;L ` U , and
(4 ) If Γ;L ` A+, Γ;A+ ` U , and U stable, then Γ;L ` U .
Beyond the additional cases needed to deal with shifts, the proof of focused cut
admissibility mirrors structural cut admissibility proofs for unfocused sequent cal-
culi. In fact, the organization strategy imposed by this four-part statement of cut
admissibility makes explicit the informal organization strategy of principal, left
commutative, and right commutative cuts that Pfenning used to present the many
cases of structural cut admissibility proofs [Pfenning 2000].
Before discussing the proof of Theorem 2, we will show how we write the four parts
of cut admissibility at the level of proof terms. By Curry-Howard, cut admissibility
corresponds to a reduction operation on proof terms that was named hereditary
substitution by Watkins et al. [2002].
Principal cuts (parts 1 and 2) are cases where the principal formula (that is, A+ or
A−) is the proposition being decomposed in the last rule of both given derivations.
In a focused sequent calculus, this naturally happens when the principal formula is
in focus in one sequent and in inversion in the other. We will refer to the operation
of principal cuts on proof terms as principal substitution:
Γ ` V : [A+] Γ;A+,Ω ` N : U
Γ; Ω ` (V •N)A+ : U cut
+
Γ; · `M : A− Γ; [A−] ` S : U U stable
Γ; · ` (M • S)A− : U cut
−
Right commutative cuts (part 3) deal with all cases where the second given deriva-
tion decomposes a proposition other than the principal formula. The action on proof
terms is rightist substitution:
Γ; · `M : A− Γ, x:A−;L ` E : U
Γ;L ` JM/xKA−E : U rsubst
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Left commutative cuts (part 4) deal with all cases where the first given derivation
ends in a left rule. The action on proof terms is a leftist substitution:
Γ;L ` E : A+ Γ;A+ ` N : U U stable
Γ;L ` JEKA+N : U lsubst
Proof. The proof of cut admissibility is by lexicographic induction. In each
invocation of the induction hypothesis, either
—the principal formula A+ or A− gets smaller, or else it stays the same and
—the “part size” (as in parts 1-4) decreases, or else both the principal formula and
part size stay the same and either
—we are in part 3 and the second given derivation gets smaller, or
—we are in part 4 and the first given derivation gets smaller.
This is actually a refinement of the standard structural induction metric presented
by Pfenning [2000], which is itself a structural-induction-flavored reinterpretation
of the metric used by Gentzen [1935] that forms the basis of most cut elimination
proofs. The extra lexicographic ordering on “part size” is nonstandard, but is
needed here to justify the appeals to principal substitution from rightist and leftist
substitution. When we look at the computational content of cut admissibility, we
can see that rightist substitutions only break apart the second given derivation
and that leftist substitutions only break apart the first derivation, and that these
substitutions do not call one another directly. Unlike the usual induction argument
for cut admissibility, there is no commitment made to the first derivation staying
the same or getting smaller while we are performing rightist substitution; the same
is true for the second derivation in leftist substitution. While it is beyond the scope
of this article, this alternate induction metric is helpful when formalizing structural
focalization in Agda.
Due to the conciseness (certainly) and clarity (optimistically) of such a presenta-
tion, we present the cases of this proof using only proof terms. This critically relies
on the fact that we understand all of our values, terms, and spines to be intrinsi-
cally typed (and therefore in 1-to-1 correspondence with focused sequent calculus
derivations).
Principal substitution. This is where the action is; it’s where both terms are
decomposed simultaneously in concert as the type gets smaller. Rightist and leftist
substitutions, in comparison, are just looking around for places where principal
substitution can happen.
(V •N)A+ = N ′ (part 1)
(z • 〈z′〉.N)p+ = [z/z′]N
(thunkM • x.N)↓A− = JM/xKA−N
(inlV • [N1, N2])A+∨B+ = (V •N1)A+
(inr V • [N1, N2])A+∨B+ = (V •N2)B+
(〈〉+ • 〈〉.N)>+ = N
(〈V1, V2〉+ • ×N)A+∧+B+ = (V2 • (V1 •N)A+)B+
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In the case where A+ = p+, we invoke focal substitution [z/z′]N to
do variable-for-variable substitution. This can also be seen as a use of
contraction.
(M • S)A− = N ′ (part 2)
(〈M〉 • nil)p− = M
({M} • pmN)↑A+ = JMKA+N
(λN • V ;S)A+⊃B− = ((V •N)A+ • S)B−
(〈M1,M2〉− • pi1;S)A−∧−B− = (M1 • S)A−
(〈M1,M2〉− • pi2;S)A−∧−B− = (M2 • S)B−
Rightist substitution. This is closest to the traditional form of substitution that
we’re used to from natural deduction: we churn through the second term to find all
the places where x, the variable we’re substituting M for, occurs (if, indeed, any
exist). When we find an occurrence of this distinguished variable, which can only
happen when the expression that we’re substituting into is a term that has decided
to focus on x, we call to negative principal substitutions (part 2). In traditional
substitution we’d just plop M down at the places where x occurred, but to do that
in this setting would introduce a cut!
JM/xKA−V = V ′ (part 3, E = V )
JM/xKA−z = zJM/xKA−thunkN = thunk (JM/xKA−N)JM/xKA− inlV = inl (JM/xKA−V )JM/xKA− inr V = inr (JM/xKA−V )JM/xKA−〈〉+ = 〈〉+JM/xKA−〈V1, V2〉+ = 〈(JM/xKA−V1), (JM/xKA−V2)〉+
JM/xKA−N = N ′ (part 3, E = N)
JM/xKA−retV = ret (JM/xKA−V )JM/xKA−(x ◦ S) = (M • JM/xKA−S)A−JM/xKA−(x′ ◦ S) = x′ ◦ (JM/xKA−S) (if x 6= x′)JM/xKA−〈z〉.N = 〈z〉.(JM/xKA−N)JM/xKA−x′.N = x′.(JM/xKA−N)JM/xKA−abort = abortJM/xKA− [N1, N2] = [(JM/xKA−N1), (JM/xKA−N2)]JM/xKA−〈〉.N = 〈〉.(JM/xKA−N)JM/xKA−×N = ×(JM/xKA−N)JM/xKA−〈N〉 = 〈JM/xKN〉JM/xKA−{N} = {JM/xKA−N}JM/xKA−λN = λ(JM/xKA−N)
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JM/xKA−〈〉− = 〈〉−JM/xKA−〈N1, N2〉− = 〈(JM/xKA−N1), (JM/xKA−N2)〉−
In the cases for η+ (proof term 〈z〉.N) and ↓L (proof term x′.N), the
bound variables z and x′ can always be α-converted to be different from
both x and any variables free in M .
JM/xKA−S = S′ (part 3, E = S)
JM/xKA−nil = nilJM/xKA−pmN = pm (JM/xKA−N)JM/xKA−V ;S = (JM/xKA−V ); (JM/xKA−S)JM/xKA−pi1;S = pi2; (JM/xKA−S)JM/xKA−pi2;S = pi1; (JM/xKA−S)
Leftist substitution. This is so named because it, rather unusually, breaks apart
the first (and not the second) derivation. This is natural from the perspective of
cut elimination: the second term N has an inversion it must do on the left, so just
like we searched in rightist substitution for any (potential) use of the focL rule on
x in the second term, we search in leftist substitution for uses of focR to derive A
+
in the first term.
JMKA+N = M ′ (part 4, E = M)
JretV KA+N = (V •N)A+Jx ◦ SKA+N = x ◦ (JSKA+N)J〈z〉.MKA+N = 〈z〉.(JMKA+N)Jx.MKA+N = x.(JMKA+N)JabortKA+N = abortJ[M1,M2]KA+N = [(JM1KA+N), (JM2KA+N)]J〈〉.MKA+N = 〈〉.(JMKA+N)J×MKA+N = ×(JMKA+N)
JSKA+N = S′ (part 4, E = S)
JpmMKN = pm (JMKN)JV ;SKN = V ; (JSKN)Jpi1;SKN = pi1; (JSKN)Jpi2;SKN = pi2; (JSKN)
This completes the proof. The four parts of this theorem are named cut+, cut-,
rsubst, and lsubst (respectively) in the accompanying Twelf development.
4. IDENTITY EXPANSION
A significant novelty of our presentation relative to existing work is our presentation
of the identity expansion theorem; it is adapted from the identity expansion theorem
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given for weak focusing [Simmons and Pfenning 2011b], a less-restricted focusing
calculus that does not require invertible rules to be applied eagerly. The familiar
identity property for an unfocused sequent calculus states that, for all propositions
A, there is a derivation Γ, A −→ A. Identity in an unfocused sequent calculus can
generally be established by structural induction on the proposition A.
As with cut admissibility, there are two analogous identity properties for the
focused sequent calculus. First, for all positive propositions A+ there is a derivation
of Γ;A+ ` A+. Second, for all negative propositions A− there is a derivation
Γ, A−; · ` A−. As an exercise, you should convince yourself that this property
cannot be established directly by structural induction on A+ or A−. It doesn’t
work, in other words, to generalize the init rule from the unfocused sequent calculus
(Figure 1) to get an identity principle for the focused sequent calculus. Instead, it
is the suggestively named η+ and η− rules that generalize to admissible identity
expansion principles:
Γ, 〈A+〉; Ω ` U
Γ;A+,Ω ` U expand
+
Γ; · ` 〈A−〉
Γ; · ` A− expand
−
When we introduced the η+ and η− rules, we said they reflected the idea that inver-
sion should not suspend itself until reaching an atomic proposition. The existence
of these admissible rules relaxes this requirement: we can optionally suspend inver-
sion before the pattern matching process is exhausted. The non-atomic suspended
propositions that appear when we suspend early appear to have a connection to
the complex values in call-by-push-value [Levy 2004].
The premises of both of these rules are definitely not suspension-normal. Unlike
cut admissibility, identity expansion is not at all restricted to suspension-normal
sequents: non-atomic suspended propositions and focal substitution play an impor-
tant role.
We associate positive identity expansion with the proof term ηA+(z.N) and neg-
ative identity expansion with the proof term ηA
−
(N), allowing us to annotate the
admissible rules above:
Γ, z:〈A+〉; Ω ` N : U
Γ;A+,Ω ` ηA+(z.N) : U expand
+
Γ; · ` N : 〈A−〉
Γ; · ` ηA−(N) : A− expand
−
Given identity expansion, the positive identity principle that Γ;A+ ` A+ holds for
all A+ is provable using positive identity expansion.
Γ, z:〈A+〉 ` z : [A+] id
+
Γ, z:〈A+〉; · ` ret z : A+ focR
Γ;A+ ` ηA+(z.ret z) : A+ expand
+
The negative identity principle that Γ, A−; · ` A− holds for all A− is similarly a
corollary of negative identity expansion.
Γ, x:A−; [A−] ` nil : 〈A−〉 id
−
Γ, x:A−; · ` x ◦ nil : 〈A−〉 focL
Γ, x:A−; · ` ηA−(x ◦ nil) : A− expand
−
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Theorem 3 Identity expansion.
(1 ) For all A+, if Γ, 〈A+〉; Ω ` U , then Γ;A+,Ω ` U .
(2 ) For all A−, if Γ; · ` 〈A−〉, then Γ; · ` A−.
Proof. The proof is by induction and case analysis on the structure of the
proposition A+ or A−.
We will present one case of part 1 and one case of part 2 line-by-line, and then
present all of the cases using the language of proof terms.
Case (part 1). A+ = A+ ∧+ B+
D :: Γ, 〈A+ ∧+ B+〉; Ω ` U given
D′ :: Γ, 〈A+〉, 〈B+〉, 〈A+ ∧+ B+〉; Ω ` U by weakening on D
E1 :: Γ, 〈A+〉, 〈B+〉 ` [A+] by rule id+
E2 :: Γ, 〈A+〉, 〈B+〉 ` [B+] by rule id+
E :: Γ, 〈A+〉, 〈B+〉 ` [A+ ∧+ B+] by rule ∧+R on E1 and E2
F :: Γ, 〈A+〉, 〈B+〉; Ω ` U by focal substitution on E and D′
F1 :: Γ, 〈A+〉;B+,Ω ` U by i.h. (part 1) on B+ and F
F2 :: Γ;A+, B+,Ω ` U by i.h. (part 1) on A+ and F1
Γ;A+ ∧+ B+,Ω ` U by rule ∧+L on F2
Case (part 2). A− = A+ ⊃− B−
D :: Γ; · ` 〈A+ ⊃ B−〉 given
D′ :: Γ, 〈A+〉; · ` 〈A+ ⊃ B−〉 by weakening on D
E1 :: Γ, 〈A+〉 ` [A+] by rule id+
E2 :: Γ, 〈A+〉; [B−] ` 〈B−〉 by rule id−
E :: Γ, 〈A+〉; [A+ ⊃ B−] ` 〈B−〉 by rule ⊃L on E1 and E2
F :: Γ, 〈A+〉; · ` 〈B−〉 by focal substitution on D′ and E
F1 :: Γ, 〈A+〉; · ` B− by i.h. (part 2) on B− and F
F2 :: Γ;A+ ` B− by i.h. (part 1) on A− and F1
Γ; · ` A+ ⊃ B− by rule ⊃R on F2
This suffices to show the line-by-line structure of the identity expansion theorem;
other cases follow the same pattern. We will now give all the cases on the level of
proof terms:
ηA
+
(v.N) = N ′ (part 1)
ηp
+
(z.N) = 〈z〉.N
η↓A
−
(z.N) = x.([thunk (ηA
−
(x ◦ nil))/z]N)
η⊥(z.N) = abort
ηA
+∨B+(z.N) = [ηA
+
(z1.[inl z1/z]N), η
B+(z2.[inr z2/z]N)]
η>
+
(z.N) = 〈〉.([〈〉+/z]N)
ηA
+∧+B+(z.N) = ×(ηA+(z1.(ηB+(z2.[〈z1, z2〉+/z]N))))
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ηA
−
(N) = N ′ (part 2)
ηp
−
(N) = 〈N〉
η↑A
+
(N) = {[N ](pm (ηA+(z.ret z)))}
ηA
+⊃B−(N) = λ(ηA
+
(z.(ηB
−
([N ](z;nil)))))
η>(N) = 〈〉−
ηA
−∧−B−(N) = 〈ηA−([N ](pi1;nil)), ηB−([N ](pi2;nil))〉−
This completes the proof; the two parts of this theorem are named expand+ and
expand- (respectively) in the accompanying Twelf development.
5. FOCALIZATION
Theorem 4 in this section establishes the focalization property: it is possible to turn
the unfocused derivation of an unpolarized sequent into a focused derivation for any
polarized sequent that erases to the unpolarized one. This proof naturally factors
into two parts. The first part is a series of unfocused admissibility lemmas, a family
of admissible rules which serve to show that focused sequent calculus derivations
can mimic unfocused derivations. The second part is a straightforward inductive
proof that, if U is stable, (Γ)~ −→ (U)~ implies Γ; · ` U . Recall that (−)~, from
Figure 6, is the erasure of polarization for contexts and succedents.
5.1 Unfocused admissibility
We think of unfocused admissibility as building an abstraction layer on top of fo-
cused, polarized logic. The proof of focalization then interacts with focused deriva-
tions entirely through the abstraction layer of unfocused admissibility.
It is possible to motivate unfocused admissibility independently of focalization.
Consider the unfocused right rules for conjunction compared to the focused right
rules for (positive) conjunction.
Γ −→ A Γ −→ B
Γ −→ A ∧B ∧R
Γ ` [A+] Γ ` [B+]
Γ ` [A+ ∧+ B+] ∧
+
R
The rules look similar, but their usage is quite different. To prove A ∧ B we must
prove A (possibly doing some work on the left first) and, in the other branch, we
must prove B (possibly doing some work on the left first). To prove A+ ∧+ B+,
we must decompose A+ in one branch and B+ in the other; there is no possibility
of doing work on the left first. The admissible rule in polarized logic that actually
matches the structure of the unfocused rule ∧R looks like this:12
Γ; · ` A+ Γ; · ` B+
Γ; · ` A+ ∧+ B+ ∧
+
uR
The stable premises A+ and B+ ensure that, in both subderivations, it will be
possible to do work on the left before decomposing A+ or B+.
The unfocused admissibility lemmas could be established the slow, painful, and
boring way, by one or more inductions over focused derivations per lemma. This
12The admissible rules associated with the lemmas in this section will all be annotated with a u
for unfocused (e.g. ∧+uR).
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D1
Γ; · ` A+
Γ; · ` ↑A+ ↑R
D2
Γ; · ` B+
Γ, ↑A+; · ` B+ weaken
Γ′ ` [A+] id
+
Γ′ ` [B+] id
+
Γ′ ` [A+ ∧+ B+] ∧
+
R
Γ′; · ` A+ ∧+ B+ focR
Γ, ↑A+, 〈B+〉;A+ ` A+ ∧+ B+ expand
+
Γ, ↑A+, 〈B+〉; [↑A+] ` A+ ∧+ B+ ↑L
Γ, ↑A+, 〈B+〉; · ` A+ ∧+ B+ focL
Γ, ↑A+;B+ ` A+ ∧+ B+ expand
+
Γ, ↑A+; · ` A+ ∧+ B+ lsubst
Γ; · ` A+ ∧+ B+ rsubst
Fig. 9. Unfocused admissibility rule ∧+uR as a derivation, where Γ′ = Γ, ↑A+, 〈B+〉, 〈A+〉.
more traditional approach is both technically and philosophically unsatisfying, how-
ever. The approach is technically unsatisfying because these theorems are long and
annoying, and it is philosophically unsatisfying because cut admissibility and iden-
tity expansion are already supposed to capture global properties of the logic. We
will instead establish unfocused admissibility directly from cut admissibility and
identity expansion without the need for any additional induction; each unfocused
admissibility proof is short, though dense. In Figure 9 we present the proof of ∧+uR
as a derivation built using admissible rules.
The unfocused admissibility lemmas will be presented in terms of the admissible
rules they justify, but their proofs will be presented entirely at the level of proof
terms. In most cases, we will omit the propositions that annotate instances of cut
admissibility. We must be careful about the interaction of cut admissibility and
identity expansion. The premises of expand+ and expand− are not suspension-
normal because they contain non-atomic suspended propositions, and cut admissi-
bility is only defined on suspension-normal sequents. All the unfocused admissibility
lemmas in this section require that the given sequents are stable and suspension-
normal, but we omit this repetitive precondition when we write the admissible
rules.13
In certain cases we do more work than necessary, such as in the left rule for ↑>+,
which could alternatively be phrased as a use of weakening. This is done to match
the structure of unfocused admissibility in substructural logics [Simmons 2012].
5.1.1 Initial rules. A positive atomic proposition can appear in the hypothetical
context either as a shifted positive proposition x:↑p+ or as a suspended positive
proposition z:〈p+〉, and likewise for negative atomic propositions on the right. As
a result, we need four initial rules to correspond to the single unfocused rule init .
(We could cut these four rules down to two if we restricted erasure and focalization
to suspension-free sequents instead of suspension-normal sequents.) Each of these
unfocused admissibility lemmas are actually directly derivable.
13For lemmas that do not use cut admissibility, stability and suspension-normality are usually
unnecessary preconditions. The mechanized proof states these less restrictive preconditions where
they apply.
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Γ, x:p−; · ` initsusp−u (x) : 〈p−〉
initsusp−u
initsusp−u (x) = x ◦ nil
Γ, x:p−; · ` init−u (x) : ↓p−
init−u
init−u (x) = ret (thunk 〈x ◦ nil〉)
Γ, z:〈p+〉; · ` initsusp+u (z) : p+
initsusp+u
initsusp+u (z) = ret z
Γ, x:↑p+; · ` init+u (x) : p+
init+u
init+u (x) = x ◦ pm (〈z〉.ret z)
5.1.2 Disjunction.
Γ, x:↑⊥; · ` ⊥uL(x) : U ⊥uL
⊥uL(x) = x ◦ (pmabort)
Γ; · ` N1 : A+
Γ; · ` ∨uR1(N1) : A+ ∨B+
∨uR1
∨uR1(N1) = JN1KA+(ηA+(z.ret (inl z)))
Γ; · ` N2 : B+
Γ; · ` ∨uR2(N2) : A+ ∨B+
∨uR2
∨uR2(N2) = JN2KB+(ηB+(z.ret (inr z)))
Γ, x1:↑A+; · ` N1 : U Γ, x2:↑B+; · ` N2 : U
Γ, x:↑(A+ ∨B+); · ` ∨uL(x, x1.N1, x2.N2) : U
∨uL
∨uL(x, x1.N1, x2.N2) = x ◦ pm (JNIdK[x1.N1, x2.N2])
whereNId = [η
A+(z1.ret (inl (thunk {ret z1}))), ηB+(z2.ret (inr (thunk {ret z1})))]
is a closed term of type ↓(↑A+) ∨ ↓(↑B+) introducing A+ ∨B+
5.1.3 Positive conjunction.
Γ; · ` >+uR : >+
>+uR
>+uR = ret 〈〉+
Γ; · ` N : U
Γ, x:↑>+; · ` >+uL(x,N) : U
>+uL
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>+uL(x,N) = x ◦ pm (〈〉.N)
Γ; · ` N1 : A+ Γ; · ` N2 : B+
Γ; · ` ∧+uR(N1, N2) : A+ ∧+ B+
∧+uR
∧+uR(N1, N2) = J{N1}/x1K↑A+(JN2KB+NId(x1))
where NId(x1) = η
B+(z2.x1 ◦ pm (ηA+(z1.ret 〈z1, z2〉+)))
is a term of type A+ ∧+ B+ introducing B+ with x of type ↑A+ free.
(This was the case given above as a derivation with admissible rules.)
Γ, x1:↑A+, x2:↑B+; · ` N1 : U
Γ, x:↑(A+ ∧+ B+); · ` ∧+uL(x, x1.x2.N1) : U
∧+uL
∧+uL(x, x1.x2.N1) = x ◦ pm (JNIdK(×x1.x2.N1))
where NId = ×(ηA+(z1.ηB+(z2.ret 〈thunk {ret z1}, thunk {ret z2}〉+)))
is a closed term of type ↓↑A+ ∧+ ↓↑B+ introducing A+ ∧+ B+.
5.1.4 Implication.
Γ, x1:↑A+; · ` N1 : ↓B−
Γ; · ` ⊃uR (x1.N1) : ↓(A+ ⊃ B−)
⊃uR
⊃uR (x1.N1) = ret (thunk (Jλx1.{N1}/xKNId(x)))
where NId(x) = λ(η
A+(z.ηB
−
x ◦ (thunk {ret z}); (pmx′.x′ ◦ nil)))
is a term introducing A+ ⊃ B− with x of type ↓↑A+ ⊃ ↑↓B− free.
Γ; · ` N1 : A+ Γ, x2:B−; · ` N2 : U
Γ, x:A+ ⊃ B−; · ` ⊃uL (N1, x2.N2) : U
⊃uL
⊃uL (x,N1, x2.N2) = JJN1KA+NId(x)K↓B−x2.N2
where NId(x) = η
A+(z.ret (thunk (ηB
−
(x ◦ (z;nil)))))
is a term of type ↓B− introducing A+ with x of type A+ ⊃ B− free.
5.1.4.1 Negative conjunction.
Γ; · ` >−uR : ↓>−
>−uR
>−uR = ret (thunk (〈〉−))
Γ; · ` N1 : ↓A− Γ; · ` N2 : ↓B−
Γ; · ` ∧−uR(N1, N2) : ↓(A− ∧− B−)
∧−uR
∧−uR(N1, N2) = ret (thunk (J〈{N1}, {N2}〉−/xKNId(x)))
where NId(x) = 〈ηA−(x ◦ pi1; pm y.(y ◦ nil)), ηB−(x ◦ pi2; pm y.(y ◦ nil))〉−
is a term introducing A− ∧− B− with x of type ↑↓A− ∧− ↑↓B− free.
Γ, x1:A
−; · ` N1 : U
Γ, x:A− ∧− B−; · ` ∧−uL1(x, x1.N1) : U
∧−uL1
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∧−uL1(x, x1.N1) = JηA−(x ◦ pi1;nil)/x1KA−N1
Γ, x2:B
−; · ` N2 : U
Γ, x:A− ∧− B−; · ` ∧−uL2(x, x2.N2) : U
∧−uL2
∧−uL2(x, x2.N2) = JηB−(x ◦ pi2;nil)/x2KB−N2
5.1.5 Shift removal. In order for the unfocused admissibility lemmas to form
a complete abstraction boundary between the focused sequent calculus and the
focalization theorem, we must account for the fact that many polarized propositions
erase to the same proposition. For example, if (A+)• = P1 and (B−)• = P2, then
P1 ⊃ P2 = (↓(A+ ⊃ B−))• = (↓↑↓(A+ ⊃ B−))• = (↓↑↓↑↓(A+ ⊃ B−))• = . . .
and so on. To deal with deeply-shifted propositions in the completeness theorem,
we will invoke a shift removal lemma. It is different from the other unfocused
admissibility lemmas in that it mentions erasure and we prove it by induction over
the structure of propositions.
Lemma 1 Shift removal (positive). If (A+)• = P , there exists a B+, not of
the form ↓↑C+, such that (B+)• = P and, for any Γ, Γ; · ` B+ implies Γ; · ` A+.
Lemma 2 Shift removal (negative). If (A−)• = P , there exists a B−, not
of the form ↑↓C−, such that (B−)• = P and, for any Γ and U stable, Γ, B−; · ` U
implies Γ, A−; · ` U
Proof. Both lemmas are by induction on the structure of the proposition A+ or
A−. If the outermost structure of the proposition is two adjacent shifts, we invoke
the induction hypothesis and apply either ↓↑uR or ↑↓uL:
Γ; · ` N1 : A+
Γ; · ` ↓↑uR(N1) : ↓↑A+
↓↑uR
↓↑uR(N1) = ret (thunk {N1})
Γ, x1:A
−; · ` N1 : U
Γ, x:↑↓A−; · ` ↑↓uL(x, x1.N1) : U
↑↓uL
↑↓uL(x, x1.N1) = x ◦ pmx1.N1
In all cases where the outermost structure of the proposition is not made up of two
adjacent shifts, we succeed immediately using the given derivation. These lemmas
are called rshifty and lshifty in the accompanying Twelf development.
5.2 Proof of focalization
Since we have not defined proof terms corresponding to unfocused sequent calculus
derivations, in the proof of the focalization we will return to the more traditional
style of proof presentation.
Theorem 4 Focalization. If U is stable and Γ and U are suspension-normal,
then (Γ)~ −→ (U)~ implies Γ; · ` U .
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The second condition, that Γ and U are suspension-normal, is not something we
strictly need to state, as (Γ)~ and (U)~ are only defined on suspension-normal
contexts and succedents.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the given derivation D. Aside from
the rule init , each rule in Figure 1 decomposes one proposition P on the left or the
right. By the definition of erasure in Figure 6, if P is being decomposed on the
right then P = (A+)• for some A+. We proceed by case analysis on the structure
of the polarized proposition A+. By the shift removal lemma, it suffices to consider
the case where this formula is not double-shifted. We will show a few representative
cases.
Case. A+ = >+, D = (Γ)~ −→ > >R
Γ; · ` >+ by unfocused admissibility lemma >+uR
Case. A+ = ↓>−, D = (Γ)~ −→ > >R
Γ; · ` ↓>− by unfocused admissibility lemma >−uR
Case. A+ = B+1 ∧+ B+2 , D =
D1
(Γ)~ −→ (B+1 )•
D2
(Γ)~ −→ (B+2 )•
(Γ)~ −→ (B+1 )• ∧ (B+2 )•
∧R
E1 :: Γ; · ` B+1 by i.h. on D1
E2 :: Γ; · ` B+2 by i.h. on D2
Γ; · ` B+1 ∧+ B+2 by unfocused admissibility lemma ∧+uR on E1 and E2
Case. A+ = ↓(B−1 ∧− B−2 ), D =
D1
(Γ)~ −→ (B−1 )•
D2
(Γ)~ −→ (B−2 )•
(Γ)~ −→ (B−1 )• ∧ (B−2 )•
∧R
E1 :: Γ; · ` ↓B−1 by i.h. on D1
E2 :: Γ; · ` ↓B−2 by i.h. on D2
Γ; · ` ↓(B−1 ∧− B−2 ) by unfocused admissibility lemma ∧−uR on E1 and E2
There are three other cases corresponding to ∨R1, ∨R2, and ⊃R. All proceed in a
similar fashion.
Similarly, if P is being decomposed on the left, then P = (A−)• for some A−,
and we proceed using the shift removal lemma and case analysis on the structure
of A−.
Case. A− = ↑(B+1 ∧+ B+2 ), D =
D1
(Γ)~, (B+1 )
• ∧ (B+2 )•, (B+1 )• −→ (U)~
(Γ)~, (B+1 )
• ∧ (B+2 )• −→ (U)~
∧L1
E1 :: Γ, ↑(B+1 ∧+ B+2 ), ↑B+1 ; · ` U by i.h. on D1
E ′1 :: Γ, ↑(B+1 ∧+ B+2 ), ↑B+1 , ↑B+2 ; · ` U by weakening on E1
E :: Γ, ↑(B+1 ∧+ B+2 ), ↑(B+1 ∧+ B+2 ); · ` U
by unfocused admissibility lemma ∧+uL on E ′1
Γ, ↑(B+1 ∧+ B+2 ); · ` U by contraction on E
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Case. A− = B−1 ∧− B−2 , D =
D1
(Γ)~, (B−1 )
• ∧ (B−2 )•, (B−1 )• −→ (U)~
(Γ)~, (B−1 )
• ∧ (B−2 )• −→ (U)~
∧L1
E1 :: Γ, B−1 ∧− B−2 , B−1 ; · ` U by i.h. on D1
E :: Γ, B−1 ∧− B−2 , B−1 ∧− B−2 ; · ` U
by unfocused admissibility lemma ∧−uL1 on E1
Γ, B−1 ∧− B−2 ; · ` U by contraction on E
There are five other non-initial cases: two corresponding to ∧L2 that mirror the
cases for ∧L1, and three corresponding to ⊥L, ∨L, and ⊃L. All proceed in a similar
fashion.
If our unfocused derivation ends with the init rule, we must observe that, ac-
cording to the definition of erasure, there are four distinct sequents that all erase
to Γ, p −→ p. An atomic proposition can be the erasure of a positive or negative
atomic proposition, and in suspension-normal sequents atomic propositions may be
suspended or not. (If p+ is a positive atomic proposition, then it can appear on
the left as either 〈p+〉 or as ↑↓ . . . ↑↓↑p+.) In each of the four cases, the theorem
proceeds directly from shift removal and the appropriate unfocused admissibility
lemma.
This theorem is named complete in the accompanying Twelf development.
5.3 Corollaries of focalization
Consider this section a short victory lap. We have established cut admissibility
and identity for the focused sequent calculus, as well as the focalization and de-
focalization properties, without reference to any properties of the unfocused sequent
calculus other than weakening and exchange. Given these four theorems, the stan-
dard metatheoretic results of the unfocused sequent calculus can be established as
straightforward corollaries. (If our goal was simply to prove cut admissibility and
identity for the unfocused sequent calculus, then proving focused cut admissibility,
identity expansion, de-focalization, and focalization would admittedly not be the
easiest way to do so!)
The only new thing we need is an arbitrary polarization strategy (P )◦ that trans-
lates unpolarized propositions to negatively polarized propositions. It is straight-
forward to then define (Γ)◦, the obvious lifting of this function to contexts.
Corollary 1. If Γ −→ P and Γ, P −→ Q, then Γ −→ Q.
Proof. Since (−)◦ is defined to be a partial inverse of erasure, the first given
derivation is equally a derivation of ((Γ)◦)~ −→ (↓(P )◦)~, and the second given
derivation is equally a derivation of ((Γ)◦, (P )◦)~ −→ (↓(Q)◦)~.
By focalization (Theorem 4), we have the focused derivations (Γ)◦; · ` ↓(P )◦
and (Γ)◦, (P )◦; · ` ↓(Q)◦, and by applying ↓L to the second of these derivations
we get (Γ)◦; ↓(P )◦ ` ↓(Q)◦. Then, by cut admissibility (Theorem 2, part 4), we
obtain a derivation of (Γ)◦; · ` ↓(Q)◦, which by de-focalization (Theorem 1) gives
us a derivation of ((Γ)◦)~ −→ (↓(Q)◦)~, which is the same thing as a derivation of
Γ −→ Q.
32 · Robert J. Simmons
Corollary 2. For all P , Γ, P −→ P .
Proof. By the identity principle, which as discussed is a corollary of identity
expansion (Theorem 3), we can obtain a derivation of (Γ)◦, (P )◦; · ` (P )◦. By de-
focalization (Theorem 1), this gives us a derivation of ((Γ)◦, (P )◦)~ −→ ((P )◦)~,
which is the same thing as a derivation of Γ, P −→ P .
These corollaries (unfocused-cut and unfocused-identity in the accompany-
ing Twelf development) are interesting primarily insofar as they establish the total
dominance that the focused sequent calculus enjoys over the unfocused sequent
calculus. We have performed precisely one induction over unpolarized propositions
(implicitly, in the definition of (−)◦) and one induction over unfocused derivations
(in the proof of focalization, Theorem 4). The cut admissibility and identity expan-
sion lemmas for the focused sequent calculus are strong enough for the unfocused
sequent calculus to inherit its metatheory from the force of the theorems in the
focused setting.
6. CONCLUSION
We have presented two sequent calculi for different variants of propositional intu-
itionistic logic, an unfocused sequent calculus for unpolarized intuitionistic logic
and a focused sequent calculus for polarized intuitionistic logic. We then proved a
strong theorem about their equivalence at the level of derivability. The equivalence
result follows from mechanized, structurally inductive proofs establishing internal
soundness and completeness for the focused logic. That equivalence result implies
the internal soundness and completeness of the unfocused logic. Our systematic
approach avoids tedious invertibility lemmas and allows for a proof, on paper or in
a mechanized setting, that scales linearly in the number of connectives and rules.
We will close with a brief survey of existing techniques used to prove the focal-
ization property, with an emphasis on intuitionistic logic.
6.1 Comparison to existing focalization proofs
The most prevalent technique by far has been to do things the long way. Andreoli’s
original presentation of a focused sequent calculus required a large and tedious series
of invertibility lemmas; Andreoli described these lemmas as “long but not difficult”
[Andreoli 1992]. Howe’s dissertation presents a similar brute-force approach to the
focalization property in the context of intuitionistic logics, including intuitionistic
linear logic [Howe 1998]. In an unpublished note, Laurent described a refactored
version of the focalization property for classical linear logic. Laurent staged the
proof differently from Andreoli, introducing several intermediate refinements with
some, but not all, of the restrictions of full focusing. Laurent’s proof is conceptually
clearer than Andreoli’s, but it still requires tedious invertibility lemmas in order to
establish the identity property [Laurent 2004].
The “grand tour” strategy of Liang and Miller stands somewhat alone as an
attempt to piggyback on established focusing results, rather than proving new ones.
Unfocused derivations are translated into classical linear logic derivations, which
are then focused. It is then only necessary to show that focused derivations can be
translated back out from the focused classical linear logic derivations [Liang and
Miller 2009]. We believe most of instances of this strategy can be understood, in the
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context of our system, as specific polarization strategies, which (as partial inverses
of erasure) are handled generically by our erasure-based proof of focalization.
The idea that focalization should arise as a consequence of the cut admissibility
and identity properties for a focused logic originates from Chaudhuri’s dissertation
[Chaudhuri 2006]. Compared to this work, Chaudhuri’s reliance on the identity
property is less direct, and his proof of identity was non-structural, relying on
a global decomposition of contexts and propositions. Chaudhuri’s technique was
generalized by Liang and Miller [2011] to any systems meeting a general set of
criteria; these criteria encompass classical and linear logics. In comparison, the
techniques in this paper have not yet been applied to classical logics, but have been
shown to extend straightforwardly to substructural and modal logics [Simmons
2012].
A line of work by Reed proved focalization by adding extra structure to the logic
being focused. Reed’s “token passing translation” obtains the necessary structure
through the use of linearity and a distinguished linear atomic proposition [Reed
2008]. His work with Pfenning, which was aimed at giving a resource semantics for
substructural logics, obtains the necessary structure through the use of first-order
terms quotiented by an equivalence relation [Reed and Pfenning 2010]. These proofs
avoid invertibility lemmas, but their technique is less direct than ours and may not
be as amenable to formalization in existing logical frameworks.
A wildly different approach to focalization can be found in the context of Zeil-
berger’s higher-order focusing [Zeilberger 2008a]. This pattern-based presentation
of logic entirely removes any mention of individual logical connectives from the core
logic; negative and positive propositions are handled in a completely generic way,
in line with synthetic presentations of focusing. This approach prevents tedious
repetition by default; there aren’t enough rules left to tediously induct upon! Po-
larization strategy-based focalization for higher-order focusing has been formalized
in the Agda proof assistant, and there do not appear to be any technical obsta-
cles to mechanizing the erasure-based approach discussed by Zeilberger [2008b].
Higher-order focused proofs represent a significant departure from the style of pre-
sentation in this paper; in particular, higher-order proof terms are infinitary, which
means the Agda mechanization cannot be ported straightforwardly in Twelf. It is
unclear what impact Zeilberger’s strategy of de-functionalizing focused derivations
(which makes them representable in Twelf and, more generally, by non-infinitary
derivations) has on focalization [Zeilberger 2009a].
The broad outlines of this paper were first developed in conjunction with our
study of ordered linear logic as a forward chaining logic programming language
[Pfenning and Simmons 2009]. For the purposes of that paper, unfocused admissi-
bility in a weakly focused sequent calculus – which did not force invertible rules to
be applied eagerly – was established the historic (long and tedious) way. A Twelf
proof for weakly focused intuitionistic logic developed at the same time was the
genesis of the structural identity expansion proof presented here [Simmons 2009].
Eventually, this Twelf proof was adapted back to ordered linear logic in a techni-
cal report that also introduced the idea of suspended propositions [Simmons and
Pfenning 2011b]. Unfortunately, to prove full focalization it was still necessary to
prove tedious invertibility lemmas [Simmons and Pfenning 2011a], meaning that the
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weak focusing technique gives no advantages beyond those provided by Laurent’s
refactoring. We believe this article supersedes our work on weak focusing entirely.
Our novel presentation of identity expansion seems to be necessary to deal with
positive propositions. In logics without any interesting positive structure, simpler
techniques have been successfully applied to prove analogues of the focalization
property. The first result in this line was Miller et al.’s work on uniform proofs
which, like Andreoli’s seminal work, was motivated by logic programming [Miller
et al. 1991]. We don’t intend to fully survey techniques applicable to settings with
only negative connectives, but we will mention two such systems. The first system
is Jagadeesan et al.’s λRCC, a mixed-paradigm logic programming language with
atoms and constraints that, in retrospect, are recognizable as instances of negative
and positive atoms. Their focalization proof roughly resembles the one used by
Miller et al. [Jagadeesan et al. 2005]. The second system is the framework in which
Reed and Pfenning developed their constructive resource semantics. This system
is notable for our purposes because its focalization proof almost exactly follows
our development [Reed and Pfenning 2010]. It was not known at the time how to
extend their proof to a language with non-trivial positive propositions.
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